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ofthe
This is a negligence case. Mr. Henrie was severely injured while working in a dangerous
environment, after being ordered by the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints (hereinafter "the Church") to help clean up a burned area in Pocatello. In
addition, the Church ordered Mr. Henrie to wear grotesquely loose clothing while he was working
in the burned area, where it was reasonably forseeable by the Church that Mr. Henrie would get hurt.
Mr. Henrie is a lifetime member of the Church and served as the Elders Quorum President
of his ward. On July 14, 2012, after receiving an order from his bishop to go to the burned area
created by the Charlotte Creek fire that occurred in Pocatello on June 28, 2012, Mr. Henrie went,
without asking any questions. Mr. Henrie believed he was doing a service at the request of the Lord.
When Mr. Henrie lined up at the staging area the Church had set up at Century High School, he
signed his name and listed his ward. Other members of the Church were handing out smocks with
the "Mormon Helping Hands" and Church logo on them. When Mr. Henrie looked at the smock,
he told the Church/Mormon Helping Hands person handing it to him that it was much too large, or,
as Mr. Henrie characterized it, "grotesquely large" and asked for a smaller smock.

The

Church/Mormon Helping Hands member there told Mr. Henrie that that smock "was all that was
left." The Church/Mormon Helping Hands member also told Mr. Henrie that it was mandatory for
him to wear the smock if he wanted to participate in the cleanup-if he did not wear it, he could not
participate.
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE
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the log Mr. Henrie was throwing caught on the smock and pulled him down the hill. Mr. Henrie,
as a result, suffered severe injuries to his right knee.
The District Court improperly weighed the evidence in this matter and abused its discretion
in striking Mr. Henrie's testimony as to the Church's representative's order that Mr. Henrie had to
wear the grotesquely large smock or he could not participate, which denied Mr. Henrie his right to
a jury trial. In addition, the District Court committed error in finding that the Church owed no duty
to Mr. Henrie, as it was clear that it was reasonably foreseeable that Mr. Henrie being forced to wear
grotesquely large clothing would cause him injuries. Also, the District Court committed reversible
error in finding there was no special relationship between Mr. Henrie and the Church, as it was not
disputed that Mr. Henrie was a member of the Church who was ordered to clean up, and that it was
again, reasonably foreseeable that his being forced to wear loose clothing would cause his injuries.
Finally, the District Court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment, as a jury, not
the District Court, is to decide proximate cause-that is, whether, again, it was reasonably foreseeable
the Church's requirement that Mr. Henrie wear the smock would have resulted in his being injured.

The Course of the Proceedings Below
On July 11, 2014, Mr. Henrie filed his complaint against the Church. R., pp. 7-10. The
Church filed its Answer on March 9, 2015. R., pp. 11-18. The initial districtjudge assigned the
case, Judge Nye, disqualified himself. R., pp. 19-20. Judge Naftz, after having the case reassigned
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL- PAGE 2
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The case was scheduled for trial the week ofMarch 15, 2016. R., pp. 28-33. On November
2, 2015, Mr. Henrie disclosed his fact and expert witnesses. R., pp. 34-35. The Church disclosed
its fact and expert witnesses on December 4, 2015. R., pp. 36-42.
On December 16, 2015, the Church filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in
Limine, with supporting memoranda and affidavits. R., pp. 43-110. Mr. Henrie filed his opposition
memorandum and affidavits to the summary judgment motion and motion in limine on January 19,
2016. R., pp. 111-203; 211-214. Mr. Henrie also filed an objection/motion to strike the Affidavit
of Paul Rytting, a Church representative, filed in support of its summary judgment motion. R., pp.
204-210. On January 25, 2016, the Church filed its reply memoranda in support of its motions in
limine and summary judgment, as well as its memorandum in opposition to Mr. Henrie's
objection/motion to strike Mr. Rytting's affidavit. R., pp. 215-246. On January 27, 2016, Mr.
Henrie filed his reply memorandum in support of his objection/motion to strike Mr. Rytting's
affidavit. R., pp. 247-251.
On February 8, 2016, a hearing was held on the parties' respective motions, and the parties
offered their respective arguments on the motions. Tr., pp. 5-28.
After the hearing on the pending motions the parties stipulated to move the trial date to May
24, 2016, which the District Court ordered. R., pp. 252-256.
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Church's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Lirnine, as

as Mr. Henrie's

objection/motion to strike Mr. Rytting's affidavit. R., pp. 257-279. The District Court also entered
Judgment dismissing the case on March 16, 2016. R., pp. 280-281. Thereafter, on March 29, 2016,
Mr. Henrie filed his notice of appeal. R., pp. 282-286.

Statement of Facts
Since he was born, Mr. Henrie was an active member of the Church, was raised in the
Church, and continues to be a member. R., 141 (Deposition of Bryan N. Henrie p. 34:3-21 ). A
graduate of Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School, subsequent to his graduation,
Mr. Henrie worked as an attorney in Pocatello from 2010 to 2014. R., p.135 (Henrie Depo., p. 11 :225). Mr. Henrie was the Elder's Quorum President of the Paradise Ward in the Tyhee Stake. R.,
142 (Henrie Depo, p.37: 16-20; R., pp.211-212 (Aff. of Fred Zundel ,i,i 2-3). Fred Zundel was Mr.
Henrie's bishop, and Kevin Loveland was the stake president. Id.
The incident giving rise to Mr. Henrie's claims occurred on July 14, 2012. R., p. 137 (Henrie
Depo., p. 19:22-20:8; R., p. 141 (Henrie Depo., p. 33:25-34: l ). Prior to the incident, on June 28,
2012, a fire broke out in the Charlotte Creek area of Pocatello. Subsequent thereto, the Church,
through its Mormon Helping Hands program, put forth a wide-scale effort, involving multiple
stakes, to clean-up the burned area. R., 143 (Henrie Depo. p. 43:1-44:11); R., pp.144-45 (Henrie
Depo. p. 48: 19-49:24); R., p.129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B-Video of the clean-up by the Church's
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up effort on the date of the incident.

Sometime prior to the incident, Mr. Henrie was given an assignment, handed down from a
member of the Stake Presidency to Bishop Fred Zundel to Mr. Henrie, the Elders Quorum President.
R., p. 141-42 (Henrie Depo.,p.36: 25-37:20); R., 144 (Henrie Depo., p.46:11-47:10); R., p. 149
(Henrie Depo., p. 68:15-16); R., pp. 212-213(Zundel Aff., ~~5-6). Mr. Henrie characterized his
bishop's assignment as an "order:"

Q.

Was it a voluntary thing, you going out and helping with the
Helping Hands, from your perspective, or was it something your
bishop-you were required to do, you had to do?

A.

Well, I mean, I'd be remiss ifl didn't say that I had some, you know,
like good intentions in terms of like wanting to help the community
out. But, you know, if we're being honest, I felt compelled because
my bishop came to me and said you're in charge of this, go out
and do it and get guys to come with you. So, I mean, especially
being the elders quorum president and having that calling and
assignment and having-you know, having sustained my bishop and
my stake presidency and my other church leaders, both local and
international, you know, the general authorities, you know, I said,
well, this is about as compulsory as it comes in terms of church
service. And, you know, I don't know that I would have gotten fired
as the elders quorum president had I not done it because-I don't
know. I don't know. But it was compulsory, as far as I was
concerned.

Q.

And it was an inner feeling you had that you wanted to do kind
of the right thing, I guess, and magnify your calling maybe and
be a leader as opposed to an external order from the bishop, you
will go; is that a fair characterization?
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Q.

Order?

A.

Yeah. There was an external order from the bishop.

Q.

Okay.

A.

It was also-I mean, I don 't-1 don't know that-I don't know that I can
adequately explain it other than just by saying that you have this
external order to do something and there are certain things that you're
ordered to do that are repugnant to you, and there are other things that
you're ordered to do that you're like, okay, that's a good thing. And
in this case the two lined up. I was ordered to do it and I said, you
know what, that's not a bad thing to do, helping people out. So I was
happy that it was-you know. And I don't-I really-you know, I don't
think that I'd ever be ordered something absolutely repugnant from
my church leaders, but-

Q.

Right.

A.

-you know-

Q.

It wasn't fun.

A.

But this was an instance in which I was ordered to do something
and I did complv.

R., pp. 14 7-48 (Henrie Depo., p. 60: l 0-62: 11) [bold underscore supplied]. Being a member of the
Church since birth, and following its teachings, Mr. Henrie further characterized his bishop's order
or calling, as follows:
And I was taught always as a deacon, as a teacher, as a priest, as an
elder, I probably will as high priest, if I ever make it-I was taught in
primary. I was taught in nursery that when somebody extends a
calling-when your bishop extends you a calling, when your stake
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Lord himself.
And so to say it's like a "will you" and if you don't, it's cool, I think that
that's-in a way, yes, like looking at it from an outside perspective. But if
you're a member of the church and somebody asks you to fulfill a
calling, you're going to accept it unless you've got a shaky testimony, I
guess, or something-because I've never turned down a calling.
R., pp. 148-49 (Henrie Depo., p. 64:21-65: 13) [emphasis supplied]. Mr. Henrie unequivocally
testified that he was ordered by his bishop to go with Mormon Helping Hands to clean up the
burned area:

Q.

Okay. So was this an order just to you as the president of the
quorum or was it to you and then for you to order the people of
the quorum to come?

A.

Well, if you break it down what he said, he said, President Henrie,
I need you to go-you need to go participate in this cleanup and
get other people to come with you, as many people as vou can
muster. So he ordered me to go and he ordered me to get other
people, as many as I could get. He never-he never came into the
elders quorum and, to my knowledge, he never went into the high
priests. He passed it off to me. He never went in and said, hey, I
need every single one of you guys to come in. He gave it to me. He
delegated that responsibility to me, but I don't think that he-I don't
think that he-I don't think he-well, he didn't. He didn't say, but if
you don't want to go, you can delegate that responsibility to
somebody else. He gave it to me.

R., p. 149 (Henrie Depo., p 65: 14-66:8) [bold underscore supplied]. Mr. Henrie also never said no
to his bishop's requests. R., p. 150 (Henrie Depo., p. 69:5-12).
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s
the Ward

m

including

Eider's Quorum President, serve

the Church to

accomplish the Church's assignments:
4. The Ward Council
4.1 Councils in the Church
The Lord's Church is governed through councils at the general, area, stake,
and ward levels. These councils are fundamental to the order of the
Church.
Under the keys of priesthood leadership at each level, leaders counsel
together for the benefit of individuals and families. Council members also
plan the work of the Church pertaining to their assignments. Effective
councils invite full expression from council members and unify their efforts
in responding to individual, family, and organizational needs.
R., p. 203 [emphasis supplied].
Sometime before 8:30 on the morning of July 14, 2012, Mr. Henrie went to Century High
School, where the Church set up a staging area to have members sign up. R., p. 144-45 (Henrie
Depo., p. 48: 19-49:3) R., p. l 60(Henrie Depo. p. 110: 16-23). There were about 500 church
members there, and they were wearing smocks with the Mormon Helping Hands logo and the
Church's name on them. R., p. 145 (Henrie Depo. p. 49:4-24); R., p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B).
There were tables set up, and Mr. Henrie lined up to sign his name and ward. R., p. 152 (Henrie
Depo. p. 77:3-79: 11 ). Mr. Henrie testified that there were sisters giving directions on where to and
what to do. R., p. 152 (Henrie Depo, p. 79: 12-19). The Church videotaped the tables and sisters
handing out smocks and telling people where to go. R., p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B-Video of the
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lS

Church's Mormon Helping Hands video. As is seen on the video, at 48-52 seconds into the video,
as well as at 1 :06-1: 13 minutes into the video, there are sisters handing out smocks and telling

people where to go. Id. Exh. B.
Mr. Henrie did not remember signing any forms or releases or waivers. R., p. 152 (Henrie
Depo. p. 80:22-81 :5). Smocks were handed out at the tables, and Mr. Henrie was handed a smock
with the Mormon Helping Hands and the Church's name on it. R., p. 153 (Henrie Depo. p. 81:682:25); R., p. 154 (Henrie Depo., p. 86: 18-20). When Mr. Henrie looked at the smock, he was
concerned as it was "grotesquely large." R., p. 154 (Henrie Depo., p. 88: 13-20). Mr. Henrie testified
that while he said it was too big, the Mormon Helping Hands person told him he had to wear it or
he could not participate.

R., p. 154 (Henrie Depo., p. 86:2-22).

Mr. Henrie testified more

specifically, as follows:

Q.

Okay. And then did she say anything about it?

A.

Whoever it was-I remember getting it. It was handed to me and I
remember saying this is really big. And they said, well, it's all
we've got left, because apparently, they'd been picked clean-well,
not-I don't know how clean because, you know, I can't vouch for
how many were left. But at that point thev said this is all we've
got left.

Q.

Okay. And it looked big to you, too big for you, is that what
you're saying?

A.

It looked really big. And, I mean, I don't know what their standard
was, but, I mean, to me it seemed-it could have been a lot tighter
fit-like a lot tighter fitting.
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it on?
A.

Yeah. I tried it on.

Q.

And you asked for a smaller size, but you were told there's none
left; is that the phrase?

A.

I tend to think that it was "this is all we've got left."

Q.

Are you fuzzy on that? Is that the gist of it or-

A.

The gist of it is that they didn't have a smaller size and that's all that
was left.

Q.

But that's all that was left. So I infer from that that there were
other sizes-smaller sizes previously, but they'd ran out; is that
what-

A.

That's what I was led to believe.

Q.

By what she said?

A.

By what the person who handed it to me said, yes.

***
Q.

And was there any discussion about whether you had to wear it
or should wear it or-

A.

Yes, there was.

Q.

What was that discussion?

A.
I was told that I had to wear it to participate in the cleanup. It
was required.

***

Q.

-the person who may have been a female, she's the one who told
you that it's required that you don the vest--

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL - PAGE 10

s correct.

me that.

Q.

-smock? Did you have a concern about it being too large at the time?

A.

Well, yeah. I said it's pretty big. I would like a smaller one so it
fits better. And that's-and then that's when they repeated it's all
we've got. So I said all right. Because, you know, to participate,
you have to wear it.

R., pp. 153-54 (Henrie Depo., p. 83: 1-84: 8; 86:2-7; 87: 10-16)[bold and underscore supplied]. Mr.
Henrie was concerned the smock was too big, for safety reasons, and that "wearing something that's
too large-a garment that's too large for you is not smart when you're working in industrial type
settings." R., p. 155 (Henrie Depo., p. 91: 1-11 ). As a result of being told he had to wear the smock
or he could not participate, Mr. Henrie felt stuck. Mr. Henrie testified:
Because she had already said thev're required for the project, they're
required for working up there and this is all we've got, so I was stuck.
I was at the front of the line and there are people behind me and they said this
is all you've got and if you're going to work on the project, you've got to
wear it. So, I mean, I was stuck. I didn't-I mean, I guess an ideal
circumstance, everything-you know, with plenty of other smocks available,
I would have said, yeah, I've got a safety concern, give me another one, but
I had already expressed my concern that it was too big and she said this
is all we've got and that you need it to work on the project, and so I
guess I just said all right. This is what I've got. I'm just going to have
to work with it. I can see your point, but I just-I was stuck. I felt stuck.
R., p. 156 (Henrie Depo., p.96:5-22) [emphasis supplied].
Mr. Henrie then proceeded to work on the project, as he was "ordered to go up and do a
service project, which involved rolling trees down a hill .... " R.,p. 157 (Henrie Depo., p. 100: 10-

12). The work put him "directly in harm's way," ... as he "could have gotten crushed." R., p. 157
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to wear a
that was too large for him, and that it was inherently dangerous, where it could catch on the tree limb
and pull him down the hill. R., p. 165 (Henrie Depo., p.131: 18-132:24).
After donning the smock, Mr. Henrie went to work, working on a hill, rolling and throwing
two foot long, approximately 70 pound sectioned logs. When he picked up a log, a branch caught
the smock he was wearing and pulled him down the hill with it. R., pp. 160-61 (Henrie Depo., p.
112:19-114:20); R., pp. 161-62 (Henrie Depo., p. 116:18-117: 17); R., pp. 163-64 (Henrie Depo., p.
122:4-9; 125:17-127:9). Mr. Henrie injured his right knee and had to have surgery. R., p. 169-70
(Henrie Depo.,p. 146:4-23; 149:13-150:3).

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court erred in the granting the Church's Motion in Limine as

to the Church's agent's statement that Mr. Henrie was required to wear the smock to participate,
where the Church's statement was an admission of a party opponent pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Evidence 80l(d)(2), as the Church's agent admitted that the smock Mr. Henrie wore at the time of
the incident giving rise to his claims was mandatory; and that the smock that was given to Mr.
Henrie was the only size that the Church had left;
2.

Whether the District Court committed error in granting the Church's Motion for

Summary Judgment in determining that there was no genuine issue of material fact the Church did
not owe Mr. Henrie any duty, when it was reasonably anticipated or foreseeable that Mr. Henrie
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wear
working in a dangerous environment;
3.

Whether the District Court committed error in granting summary judgment to the

Church in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that no special relationship
between Mr. Henrie, and in forcing him to wear the smock in the clean up efforts in which the
Church compelled Appellant to work;
4.

Whether the District Court committed error in granting summary judgment by

concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact as to proximate cause between Mr. Henrie's
injury and the Church's act of forcing him to wear a smock while working in a reasonably
foreseeable dangerous situation.
5.

Whether Mr. Henrie is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to

Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41.
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law."' Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718,
918 P.2d 583, 587 (I 996)(quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)); see also Avila v. Wahlquist, 126 ldaho 745,890
P.2d 331 (1995). In making this determination, a court should liberally construe the record in favor
of the party opposing the motion and draw al1 reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's
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at

"has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish a triable issue which arises from the
facts, and a genuine issue of fact is not created by a mere scintilla of evidence." Jarman v. Hale, 122
Idaho 952, 955-956, 842 P.2d 288, 291-292 (Ct. App. 1992)(internal citations omitted). However,
"[i]f the moving party fails to challenge an element or fails to present evidence establishing the
absence of genuine issue of material fact on that element, the burden does not shift to the nonmoving
party, and the nonmoving party is not required to respond with supporting evidence." Smith, supra,
128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 588 (citing Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530
887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994)). Additionally, based on the evidence, if reasonable persons could
reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences, summary judgment must be denied. City

ofChubbuckv. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198,200,899 P.2d41 l, 413 (1995)(citation omitted),
citing Harris v. Department of Health and Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159
(1992)).

ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY WEIGHED THE EVIDENCE AND
FAILED TO GIVE MR. HENRIE ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES FROM
THE RECORD, THEREBY MISAPPLYING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STANDARD.

The rules applying to a court's determination of summary judgment are as follows:
As we have reiterated in our recent cases, upon a motion for summary
judgment, all disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the
non-moving party. The burden of proving the absence of a material fact
rests at all times upon the moving party. This burden is onerous because
even "[c]ircumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of material
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record contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might
reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied because
all doubts are to be resolved against the moving party. The requirement
that all reasonable inferences be construed in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when a party moves for
summary judgment the opposing party's case must not rest on mere
speculation because a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue of fact. Notwithstanding the utility of a summary judgment,
a motion for summary judgment should be granted with caution.

McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769-70, 820 P.2d 360, 364-65(1991 )[internal citations
omitted][ emphasis added]. Furthermore, it is well-established that on summary judgment, a trial
court is not allowed to weigh the evidence and is to resolve all doubts against the moving party:
The trial court, when confronted by a motion for summary judgment, must
determine if there are factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of
facts. On such a motion it is not the function of the trial court to weigh
the evidence or to determine those issues. Moreover, all doubts must be
resolved against the party moving for a summary judgment.

Merrill v. Duffy Reed Cons tr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414, 353 P.2d 657, 659 (1960)[ emphasis added].
See also, American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 P.2d 1063, 1064 (1983) ("A
trial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or resolve
controverted factual issues."); Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724,730,552 P.2d 776,
782 (1976)(citing, Merrill, supra); ,Meyers v. Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 849, 993 P.2d 609, 612
(2000)("The district court may not weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues.")).
Additionally, "[a] motion for summary judgment should be denied if the pleadings, admissions,
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supra, 82 Idaho at 41
1.

353

at

The District Court improperly weighed the evidence and credibility of Mr.
Henrie in excluding his testimony that a Church agent told him he had to wear
the grotesquely large smock or he could not participate.

It is well-settled that a trial court is not allowed to weigh the evidence or assess the

credibility of witnesses on summary judgment. The District Court violated this rule by excluding
Mr. Henrie's testimony that a Church agent told Mr. Henrie that he had to wear the oversized smock,
or he could not participate in the clean-up efforts the Church had ordered him to do. R., p. 266. In
reaching its decision, the District Court weighed the evidence. Here, there is no question the Church
held the people handing out smocks and signing in other members as its agents. Also, Mr. Henrie
testified that there were "sisters" at the tables, giving directions on where to go and what to do. R.,
152 (Henrie Depo., p. 79: 12-19). Smocks were handed out at the tables the Church set up, and Mr.
Henrie was handed a smock with the Mormon Helping Hands and the Church's name on it. R., 153
(Henrie Depo., p. 81 :6-82:25); R., p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B (Mormon Helping Hands Video)).
Mr. Henrie's testimony is corroborated by the Church's Mormon Helping Hands video. As is seen
on the Mormon Helping Hands video, at 48-52 seconds into the video, as well as at 1 :06-1: 13
minutes into the video, there are sisters handing out smocks, and telling people where to go.

Id. Exh. B.
Further, Mr. Henrie's deposition testimony the smock was too big, which the District Court
ignored in weighing the evidence, is as follows:
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A.

Whoever it was-I remember getting it. It was handed to me and I
remember saying this is really big. And thev said, well, it's all
we've got left, because apparently, they'd been picked clean-well,
not-I don't know how clean because, you know, I can't vouch for
how many were left. But at that point thev said this is all we've
got left.

Q.

Okay. And it looked big to you, too big for you, is that what
you're saying?

A.

It looked really big. And, I mean, I don't know what their standard
was, but, I mean, to me it seemed-it could have been a lot tighter
fit-like a lot tighter fitting.

Q.

So did you put it on?

A.

Yeah. l tried it on.

Q.

And you asked for a smaller size, but you were told there's none
left; is that the phrase?

A.

I tend to think that it was "this is all we've got left."

Q.

Are you fuzzy on that? Is that the gist of it or-

A.

The gist of it is that they didn't have a smaller size and that's all that
was left.

Q.

But that's all that was left. So I infer from that that there were
other sizes-smaller sizes previously, but they'd ran out; is that
what-

A.

That's what I was led to believe.

Q.

By what she said?

A.

By what the person who handed it to me said, yes.

***
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was
any
or should wear it orA.

Yes, there was.

Q.

,vhat was that discussion?

to wear it

I was told that I had to wear it to participate in the cleanup. It
A.
was required.

***
Q.

-the person who may have been a female, she's the one who told
you that it's required that you don the vest--

A.

That's correct. She told me that.

Q.

-smock? Did you have a concern about it being too large at the time?

A.

Well, yeah. I said it's pretty big. I would like a smaller one so it
fits better. And that's-and then that's when they repeated it's all
we've got. So I said right. Because, you know, to participate, you
have to wear it.

R., pp. 153-54 (Henrie Depo., p. 83: 1-84: 8; 86:2-7; 87: 10-16)[emphasis supplied]. Mr. Henrie was
concerned the smock was too big, for safety reasons, and that "wearing something that's too large-a
garment that's too large for you is not sma1i when you're working in industrial type settings." R.,
155 (Henrie Depo., p. 91: 1-11 ). As a result of being told he had to wear the smock or he could not

participate, Mr. Henrie felt stuck;
Because she had already said they're required for the project, they're
required for working up there and this is all we've got, so I was stuck.
I was at the front of the line and there are people behind me and they said
this is all you've got and if you're going to work on the project, you've
got to wear it. So, I mean, I was stuck. I didn't-I mean, I guess an ideal
circumstance, everything-you know, with plenty of other smocks available,
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I would
I
a
concern,
me
one,
I had alreadv expressed rnv concern that it was too big and she said this
is all we've got and that you need it to work on the project, and so I
guess I just said all right. This is what I've got. I'm just going to have
to work with it. I can see vour point, but I just-I was stuck. I felt stuck.
R., p. 156 (Henrie Depo., p.96:5-22) [emphasis supplied].
The Church's agent's/Mormon Helping Hands person's statement is corroborative evidence
and admissible, especially where there is independent evidence, here, the Mormon Helping Hands
video, showing everyone was wearing the Church's smock. In addition, the District Court further
weighed the evidence when it ignored the undisputed evidence that the Church was the only entity
involved in the clean-up. Further, the District Court ignored the video Mr. Henrie placed into the
record showing the "Mormon Helping Hands" smocks and people wearing them, which was created
and sponsored by the Church. The District Court concluded there was no evidence to establish the
person handing out the smocks was with the Church and "Mormon Helping Hands." R., pp. 264266 Again, Mr. Henrie put in the record the Mormon Helping Hands video, showing that the
Church was organizing the clean-up. In addition, that video proved Mr. Henrie's testimony that
everyone was required to wear the smock, as it shows the participants wearing the "Mormon
Helping Hands" smocks.

The District Court cherry-picked Mr. Henrie's testimony, thereby

weighing it, in violation of the summary judgment standard prohibiting the District Court from
weighing the evidence. As a result, the Court should reverse the District Court's decision and
remand the matter for further proceedings.
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2.

to

as to

The District Court did not give the inference from Mr. Henrie's testimony that it was the
Church's agent, and no one else's agent, that told him he had to wear the grotesquely large smock
or he could not participate. Again, the Church did not place any evidence in the record that there
were other entities involved in the clean-up, or that other agents, besides agents of and for the
Church, that were handing out yellow "Mormon Helping Hands" smocks. Again, as Mr. Henrie
testified, there were "sisters" handing out the smocks. R., 152 (Henrie Depo., p. 79: 12-19). This
is, again corroborated by the Mormon Helping Hands video, with people all wearing the smock
the Church required them to wear to work in the clean-up. R., p. 129, Exh. B., at 48-52 seconds
into the video, as well as at 1:06-1:13 minutes into the video. Clearly, the District Court did not
give Mr. Henrie the inference that it was the Church, through its agent handing out the Mormon
Helping Hands smocks, that told Mr. Henrie he had to wear the smock or he could not participate.
Further, Mr. Henrie's testimony, along with the Mormon Helping Hands video, sufficiently
establishes the Church required Mr. Henrie to wear the smock or he could not participate. At the
very least, a reasonable inference from Mr. Henrie's testimony and the Mormon Helping Hands
video is that the person handing out the smocks and te11ing Mr. Henrie that he had to wear it or he
could not participate, was an agent of the Church, which is sufficient to give to a jury to decide. 1

The Church clearly used the video for public relations and propaganda, but distances
itself from the video for any responsibility for its actions. This double standard should not be
rewarded.
1
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was

3.

to

a

The Church never disputed that it was the only entity engaged in the clean-up
effort.

As the moving party, the Church had the burden of establishing that some other entity was
involved in the clean-up effort. However, the record is not disputed that the Church, and the
Mormon Helping Hands, which is also the Church, was the only entity involved in the clean-up
effort. The Church never disputed this fact, nor did it provide any evidence to the contrary, which
was its burden as the moving party on summary judgment. The District Court ignored this
undisputed fact, which violates the summary judgment standard. As a result, this Court should
reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN EXCLUDING MR.
HENRIE'S TESTIMONY THAT THE CHURCH'S AGENT TOLD HIM HE
WAS REQUIRED TO WEAR THE SMOCK OR HE COULD NOT
PARTICIPATE.

On summary judgment, the admissibility of evidence is based on an abuse of discretion
standard. Nield v. Pocatello Health Serv., Inc., 156 Idaho 802,810,332 P.3d 714, 722 (2014). On
appellate review, this Court asks: ( 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court
reached its decision by an exercise ofreason. State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,421,224 P.3d 485,
488 (2009). However, the trial court's discretion does not entitle it to alter or disregard specific
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or

to

courts do not have "broad discretion." In that regard, this

held:

In State v. Maylett, 108 Idaho 671,674, 701 P.2d 291,294 (Ct.App.1985),
Judge Burnett filed a special concurrence in which he challenged statements
by this Court that trial courts have "broad discretion" over evidentiary
rulings. Judge Burnett stated that:
The law of evidence is structured by rules, forged by centuries of
experience and continually tested against evolving notions of fairness and
truth-seeking. Our Supreme Court recently has adopted a detailed and
painstakingly drafted formulation of such rules. See Idaho Rules of Evidence
(effective July 1, 1985). These rules are not mere precatory guides to
discretion; they are standards controlling the outcome of evidentiary
questions. A trial judge possesses no "discretionary" authority to alter
or to disregard specific standards-particularly in criminal trials, where
these standards impart real meaning to an accused's right to a fair trial.
Discretion is properly exercised only when a rule of evidence calls for it.

We have recognized and cited Judge Burnett's analysis approvingly. State v.
Smith, 117 Idaho225,234, 786P.2d 1127, 1136(1990)(citingMaylett, 108
Idaho at 674, 70 l P.2d at 294 (Burnett, J., specially concurring) ("Discretion
is properly exercised only when a rule of evidence calls for it.")).
Watkins, supra, 148 Idaho at 420-21, 224 P.3d at 487-88 [bold emphasis supplied]. In addition, this

Court in Watkins further held that a trial court's discretion is only broad where it is the fact finder
and bounded by the rules and principles of law:
We have emphasized that the trial court's discretion is only broad when
it acts as a fact finder: With respect to the admission of evidence, the
trial court has broad discretion and its judgment in the fact finding role
will only be disturbed on appeal when there has been a clear abuse of
discretion. Further, we have refined our statement that a trial court has
discretion over evidentiary rulings by noting that nevertheless, questions of
relevancy are reviewed de novo. In short, our previous decisions reflect our
understanding that application of the rules of evidence require trial courts to
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answer
1s
"discretion
respect to our standard
rulings, we mean judicial discretion, i.e., the discretionary action of a
judge or court ... bounded by the rules and principles of law, and not
arbitrary, capricious, or unrestrained. It is not the indulgence ofajudicial
whim, but the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by
Jaw, or the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the
circumstances. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course
prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of the judge, but to that
of the law. Our commonly used standard for determining whether a trial
court abused its discretion with respect to an evidentiary ruling incorporates
this meaning of judicial discretion.

Watkins, 148 Idaho at 421, 224 P.3d at 488 [internal citations omitted][italics in original][bold
emphasis supplied]. In Watkins, this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion, finding that
the trial comi incorrectly decided an issue related to hearsay, and remanded the case for a new trial.
Id., 148 Idaho at 423-427, 224 P.3d at 490-494.

In addition, where an incorrect ruling regarding evidence occurs, relief is granted where the
error affects a substantial right of the one of the parties. Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., 145
Idaho 892, 897, 188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008). In this matter, Mr. Henrie certainly has a substantial
right-that is, the right to a trial by jury, which he requested. R., 10. The Constitution of the United
States, Amendment VII, and the Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article I, § 7 both grant the
parties to a civil suit the right to a trial by an impartial jury. Further, pursuant to Article I,§ 7, the
right to trial by jury "shall remain inviolate." Additionally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a),
provides the parties to a civil suit the right to a jury trial.
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The

abused its
agent told him
had to wear the crr,,1-o,,n
participate in the Church's clean up effort.

The District Court abused its discretion, and wrongfully decided that the Church's agent's
statement to Mr. Henrie, that if he wanted to participate in the project, he would have to wear the
oversized, "grotesquely large" Mormon Helping Hands smock, was hearsay. To the contrary, the
Church's agent's statements that Mr. Henrie had to wear the oversized smock was an admission of
a party opponent, and not hearsay. As I.R.E 80 I provides:
d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if -

***
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested
an adoption or beliefin its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by
a party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by a
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the
agency or employment of the servant or agent, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
[emphasis supplied]. A statement by a party opponent, and a statement of an agent of a party
opponent, is not hearsay. McGill v. Frasure, 117 Idaho 598, 602, 790 P.2d 379, 383 (Ct. App.
1990); Vreeken v. Lockwood Engineering, 148 Idaho 89,107,218 P.3d 1150, 1168 (2009). As the
moving party on summary judgment, the Church had the burden of showing that there were other
religious organizations or entities involved in the clean up and that those agents were handing out
Mormon Helping Hands smocks. The Church posited no evidence establishing that the person who
told Mr. Henrie he had to wear the smock or he could not participate was not its agent who required
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no

affidavit stating that it and the Mormon Helping Hands were not the only entities at the marshaling
area, nor did it posit any evidence showing that other entities were handing out the Monnon Helping
Hands smocks. What the record does show, is that the Church's members who were at the project,
were all wearing the Mormon Helping Hands smocks. R., p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B ( Mormon
Helping Hands Video).
In addition, the Church held its Mormon Helping Hands people out as persons with apparent
authority to act at its agent. In Idaho, it has long been settled that apparent authority exists "when
a principal voluntarily places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence,
conversant with the business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in believing
that the agent is acting pursuant to existing authority." Clarkv. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12, 501 P.2d
278, 280 (1972); Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing, Clark,

supra). Apparent authority is sufficient to bind a principal to a contract entered into by an agent
with a third party, as long as the agent acted within the course and scope of authority delegated by
the principal. Clark, supra, 95 Idaho, at 11-12, 50 I P.2d at 279-80; Bailey, supra, 109 Idaho at 498,
708 P.2d at 903. In addition, the issue of apparent authority is a question for the jury to decide.

Clark, 95 Idaho at 12,501 P.2d at 280; Bailey, 109 Idaho at 498, 708 P.2d at 903. Finally, "where
the agency has been established by independent evidence, the declarations [of the alleged
agent] as corroborative evidence are admissible." Clark, supra, 95 Idaho at 12, 501 P.2d at 280

(citations omitted)(emphasis supplied)).
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Here, there is no question the Church held its Mormon Helping Hands people handing out
smocks and signing

other members as

agents. Mr. Henrie

that there were "sisters"

at the tables, giving directions on where to go and what to do. R., P. 152 (Henrie Depo., Id., p.
79:12-19). Smocks were handed out at the tables, and Mr. Henrie was handed a smock with the
Mormon Helping Hands and the Church's name on it. R., p. 153 (Henrie Depo., p. 81 :6-82:25); R.,
p. 129 (Gabiola Aff., Exh. B ( Mormon Helping Hands Video). Under Clark, supra, the Mormon
Helping Hands person's statement is corroborative evidence and admissible, especially where there
is independent evidence, here, the Mormon Helping Hands video, showing everyone was wearing
the Church's smock. Further, this sufficiently establishes a fact, and therefore a reasonable inference
to which Mr. Henrie is entitled, that the person who handed him the smock and told him he had to
wear it or he could not participate was an agent of the Church. Such evidence is not hearsay; it is
an admission of a party opponent, and the District Court erred in granting summary judgment when
faced with such evidence. Furthermore, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment, as
it is an issue of fact for the jury to decide as to the agency relationship between the person making
the statement and the Church.
Despite this, again, the District Court wrongfully chose to weigh the evidence to conclude
that Mr. Henrie's statements were hearsay. 2 The District Court concluded that "the record is utterly
devoid of any evidence of any agency relationship between the unidentifiable person handing the

2The

District Court was also incorrect in its analysis of hearsay under I.R.E. 80I(d)(2).
The statements are not hearsay, as the statements are an admission of a party opponent, which,
by definition, is not hearsay.
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and discounted the fact

Henrie's statements

the

s agent told

to wear

the smock were corroborated by the Mormon Helping Hands video, which showed every person
involved in the clean up wearing the Mormon Helping Hands smock. Clearly, the District Court
wrongfully decided that Mr. Henrie's testimony was hearsay, and wrongfully granted summary
judgment. The District Court's evidentiary error is a basis for this Court to reverse the ruling and
remand for further proceedings, as the District Court's decision denied Mr. Henrie his substantial
and constitutionally protected right to a jury trial.
C.

AS THE CHURCH O\VED MR. HENRIE A DUTY, AND BREACHED ITS
DUTY, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.

l.

Relevant law.
a.

General duty and foreseeability.

In an action for negligence, the elements are a duty, recognized by law, requiring the
defendant to conform to a ce1iain standard of conduct; a breach of that duty; a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and actual loss or damages. Coghlan

v. Beta Theat Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). Whether a duty exists
is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Rees v. State, Dept. ofHealth and

Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 14, 137 P.3d 397, 401 (2006). However, as this Court held in Alegria v.
Payonk, IOI Idaho 617,619 P.2d 135 (1980):
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men
conclusions to be drawn, or where different conclusions might reasonably be
reached by different minds, the question of negligence ... and proximate
cause is one of fact to be submitted to the jury and not a question of law
for the court; if, upon all the facts and circumstances, there is a
reasonable chance or likelihood of the conclusions of reasonable men
differing, the question is one for the jury.

Alegria, 101 Idaho at 619-20, 619 P.2d at 137-38 [internal quotations and citation omitted][bold
emphasis supplied].
Additionally, this Court in Alegria recognized that every person owes a duty to use
reasonable and ordinary care to another person:
[O]ne owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to
avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result
in such injury ... .Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary
care not to injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in
operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his property as
to avoid such injury. In determining whether such duty has been breached by
the allegedly negligent party, his conduct is measured against that of an
ordinarily prudent person acting under all the circumstances and conditions
then existing.

Alegria, I 01 Idaho at 619,619 P.2d at 137 [internal quotations and citations omitted][bold emphasis
supplied]. See also, Sharp v. WH. Moore Inc., 118 Idaho 297, 300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990)
("E]ach person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of hann to others.").
In addition, this Court has also identified additional factors to detern1ine whether a duty arises:
[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the
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a

duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability,
cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 311 [internal citations omitted].
Clearly, then, a duty is owed where it could be reasonably anticipated or forseen that a
failure to use such care might result in such injury. This Court in Sharp explained the concept of
duty and forseeability, as follows:
Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure
others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and
to do his work, render services or use his property as to avoid such injury.
The degree of care to be exercised must be commensurate with the
danger or hazard connected with the activity. Whether the duty attaches
is largely a question for the trier of fact as to the foreseeability of the
risk.
Foreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the
circumstances of each case. Where the degree of result or harm is great,
but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability
is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the
burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of
foreseeability may be required. Thus, foreseeability is not to be
measured by just what is more probable than not, but also includes
whatever result is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a
reasonably prudent person would take such into account in guiding
reasonable conduct.
Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 509-10 [internal quotations and citations omitted] [bold
emphasis supplied]. In addition, the Court in Sharp, in rejecting the "prior similar incidents"
argument, held that "only the general risk ofhann need be foreseen, not the specific mechanism of
injury":
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to come
that prior similar incidents of criminal activity had occurred in the building
or in its vicinity. However, the "prior similar incidents" rule was rejected
recently by a leading case upon which the trial court purported to rely to the
contrary.

***
The solid and growing national trend has been toward the rejection of the
"prior similar incidents" rule.

***
Reduced to its essence, the "prior similar incidents" requirement translates
into the familiar but fallacious saying in negligence law that every dog gets
one free bite before its owner can be held to be negligent for failing to
control the dog. That license which is refused to a dog's owner should be
withheld from a building's owner and the owner's agents as well. There is no
"one free rape" rule in Idaho. The "prior similar incidents" requirement
is not only too demanding, it violates the cardinal negligence law
principle that only the general risk of harm need be foreseen, not the
specific mechanism of injury. Such a requirement would remove far too
many issues from the jury's consideration. Foreseeability is ordinarily
a question of fact.

Sharp, 118 Idaho at 301, 796 P.2d at 510 [emphasis supplied][intemal citations omitted]. See also,
Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846-47, 908 P.2d 143, 148-49 (1996)( citing, Sharp). As held in Sharp,
foreseeability is a question for the trier of fact. Additionally, the maxim that where the degree of
harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, results in only showing a relatively low degree of
foreseeability.
b.

Duty arising due to a special relationship.

Further, a duty to act arises where a special relationship exists. Turpen v. Granieri, 133
Idaho 244, 985 P .2d 669 (1999). "[A] special relationship exists between the actor and the other
which gives the other a right to protection." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. Moreover,
as this Court held in Rees, supra:
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is entitled to protection.

Id., 143 Idaho at 15, 137 P.3d at 402 [internal citation omitted].
c.

Proximate cause.

It is well-settled that the "question of proximate cause is one of fact and almost always for
the jury." Cramerv. Slater, 146 Idaho 868,875,204 P.3d 508,515 (2009). "The legal responsibility
element of proximate causation is satisfied if at the time of the defendant's negligent act the
plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable as a natural or probable consequence of the defendant's
conduct." Doe Iv. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1041, 895 P.2d 1229, 1234 (Ct. App.
1995). Furthermore, proximate cause can be shown from a "chain of circumstances from which the
ultimate fact required to be established is reasonably and naturally inferable." Nield v. Pocatello

Health Serv. Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 812-13, 332 P.3d 714, 725-26 (2014).
2.

Whether it was reasonably forseeable that Mr. Henrie would be injured when
the Church ordered him to work in the clean up effort and forced him to wear
the grotesquely large smock is a jury question.

The District Court erred in granting summary judgment, as it is indeed a jury question to the
issue of foreseeability of whether Mr. Henrie could have been injured. Idaho law requires a showing
that the risk of harm was foreseeable, not the mechanism of injury. Sharp, supra. Certainly, the risk
of injury in forcing Mr. Henrie to wear a dangerously, "grotesquely large" smock, solely for the
reason that the Church could show the community it performs services for the community, was high,
as illustrated by the fact that it got caught on a log and sent Mr. Henrie tumbling down a hill. This
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industrial setting, where loose clothing has the increased potential to cause severe injuries or death.
Mr. Henrie testified that he was concerned the smock was too big, for safety reasons, and that
"wearing something that's too large-a garment that's too large for you is not smart when you're
working in industrial type settings." R., p. 15 5 (Henrie Depo., p. 91: 1-11 ). Mr. Henrie also feltthat
the Church forced him in to wearing a large smock was inherently dangerous, where it could catch
on a tree limb and pull him down the hill. R., p. 165 (Henrie Depo., p.131: 18-132:24). Mr. Henrie's
concerns rang true, obviously, as when he picked up a log, a branch caught the smock he was
wearing and pulled him down the hill with it. R., pp. 160-61 (Henrie Depo., p. 112: 19-114:20; R.,
pp. 161-62 (Henrie Depo., p. 116:18-117:17; R., pp. 163-64 (Henrie Depo., p. 122:4-9; 125:17127:9).
Furthermore, the District Court usurped the jury's function in concluding that it was not
reasonably expected that loose clothing could become entangled and cause Mr. Henrie to tumble
down the hill. R., p. 273. The District Court's conclusion was much too narrow, and ignored the
"cardinal negligence law principle that only the general risk of harm need be foreseen, not the
specific mechanism of injury." Sha1p, 118 Idaho at 301,796 P.2d at 510. It is the inherent risk of
injury of working on a hillside, throwing large logs down a hill, and the risk of harm associated with
that, not specifically whether it was foreseeable that the smock could have caused the injury, that
is relevant, although, again, wearing loose clothing, too, is reasonably foreseeable as creating a risk
or har111.
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to determine whether a duty arises, citing that it would "kill the Helping Hands organization" if Mr.
Henrie's claim were allowed to go forward. 3 R., p. 273. The District Court ignored other factors
to determine foreseeability, as this Court listed in Sharp:
Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not
difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely,
where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing such
injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. Thus,
foreseeability is not to be measured by just what is more probable than
not, but also includes whatever result is likely enough in the setting of
modern life that a reasonably prudent person would take such into
account in guiding reasonable conduct.

Sharp, 118 Idaho at 300-01, 796 P.2d at 509-10 [emphasis added]. It beggars belief that the
Church's liability to Mr. Henrie for damages, would "kill" any future efforts by the Church, since
it is well-known that the Church is a multi-billion dollar religious/charitable organization. 4

The District Court's reasoning that it would "kill the Helping Hands organization" is not
only improper in law, but also in scripture. See Matthew 6: l (Latter Day Saint Version): "Take
heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them: otherwise ye have no reward
of your Father which is in heaven." [emphasis supplied].
3

Additionally, the District Court improperly sided with the Church, with the apparent
belief that because the Church is a charitable entity, it should not be liable to Mr. Henrie for
damages. This is improper, given this Court's holding in Steed v. Grand Teton Council of the
Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007). In Steed, this Court held
that: "This Court has previously rejected the arguments that it should immunize charitable
organizations from liability in tort for public policy reasons. Although the Wheat opinion
left open the possibility that a nonpaying recipient of the charitable organization's services
could be held to have impliedly waived the right to recover damages resulting from the
negligence of the organization's employees, we also reject that rationale. Subject to certain
4
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foreseeability of harm to Mr. Henrie; the closeness of

connection between the Church's act of

forcing Mr. Henrie to wear the grotesquely large and loose smock; moral blame attached to the
Church's conduct; and the policy of preventing future harm. The District Court did not engage in
analyzing these other pertinent factors. Rather, it placed its entire emphasis on whether it would
"kill" the Church's program, and based its decision solely on that factor. In doing this, the District
Court clearly committed reversible enor. It is for the jury, not the District Court, to decide whether
the degree of harm was great, and preventing it was not difficult, i.e. the Church not forcing Mr.
Henrie to wear the grotesquely large smock would have prevented his injuries. As a result, Mr.
Henrie is entitled to an order reversing the grant of summary judgment and remanding the case back
for further proceedings.
3.

A special relationship existed between the Church and Mr. Henrie.

There is no dispute that Mr. Henrie was the Elders Quorum president of his ward, and that
his bishop, Fred Zundel, gave him an assignment to clean up the burned area. R., p. 141-42 (Henrie
Depo.,p.36: 25-37:20); R., 144 (Henrie Depo., p.46: 11-47: 10); R., p. 149 (Henrie Depo., p. 68: 1516); R., pp. 212-213(Zundel Aff., ,i,i 5-6). Again, Mr. Henrie characterized his bishop's assignment

exceptions, parties to a transaction may agree by contract to limit liability or waive rights and
remedies. Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976,695 P.2d 361 (1984). It would be improper for
the Court to step in and imply a waiver that the parties did not agree to. Id., 144 Idaho at 856,
172 P.3d at 1131 [bold emphasis supplied].
As to waiver, it is not disputed that Mr. Henrie did not sign any waiver or release. R.,
152-53 (Henrie Depo., p. 80:22-81 :5).
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48 (Henrie Depo., p. 60: 10-63: 15). Mr. Henrie unequivocally testified that he was ordered by his
bishop to go with Mormon Helping Hands to clean up the burned area. R., p. 149 (Henrie Depo.,
p 65:14-66:8). Mr. Henrie also never said no to his bishop's requests. R., p. 150 (Henrie Depo., p.
69:5-12). Again, Mr. Henrie's testimony is copasetic with the Church's organizational structure,
in that the members of the Ward Council, including the Elders Quorum President, serve in the
Church to accomplish the Church's assignments and meet the Church's organizational needs. R.,
p. 203. Clearly, there was a special relationship between Mr. Henrie and the Church.
The District Court, again, weighing the evidence, simply found that the Church was only a
community organizer bringing together individual volunteers. R., p. 274. The District Court again
ignored the fact that the Church, along with Church members, was the only entity at the event and
the only entity performing the clean-up. In addition, the District Court ignored the fact that Mr.
Henrie was an Elders Quorum President, ordered by his bishop, to go assist in the clean-up effort
that only the Church was performing. Further, it was reasonably foreseeable that wearing large
clothing, and the Church forcing Mr. Henrie to wear the loose and grotesquely large clothing in a
burned out area throwing large logs, would result in the injuries he suffered. That reasonably
foreseeable risk could have been easily prevented, i.e. the Church not forcing Mr. Henrie to wear
the grotesquely large smock. Further, the Church had the right to control Mr. Henrie's conduct.
Again, Mr. Henrie was ordered by the Church to go to the burned out area, and oversaw the clean
up effort. All of these issues were for the jury to decide, not the District Court.
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The issue of proximate cause is a jury question. Here, it is also an issue of fact as to whether
the risk of harm the Church forced Mr. Henrie to work in was reasonably foreseeable. Whether Mr.
Henrie's bishop ordered him to go to the clean-up is a question of fact also. Mr. Henrie's bishop
acknowledged he gave Mr. Henrie an assignment. Mr. Henrie, being a life-long member of the
Church, who was taught that when you are requested or given an assignment, you do it, because the
Church considers it as a request from the Lord. Thus, the jury, not the District Court, is to decide
how a reasonable member would view an assignment from his bishop and whether Mr. Henrie
rightfully took it as an order. This "order," when combined with the Church's agent's statementthat
you wear the Mormon Helping Hands smock or you cannot fulfill the Lord's request, and, thereafter,
putting on the grotesquely oversized smock, establish an issue of fact as to proximate cause. In other
words, this chain of circumstances-an order from your bishop, a directive from the Church to wear
the smock, grotesquely large as it is, and it getting caught on a log causing Mr. Henrie to fall, is a
determination for the jury.
In addition, the District Court erred in finding there was no evidence whether wearing the
smock created an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm, or that there was no evidence the smock
was actually too large for him. R., p. 277. Contrary to the District Court's conclusion, Mr. Henrie
testified, without objection by the Church, that the smock was "grotesquely large." R. p. 154
(Henrie Depo., p. 88: 13-20). Further, the District Court struck the Church's agent's affidavit who
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testimony the smock was too large and loose fitting. The record also shows that Mr. Henrie's smock
got caught on a log and caused him to fall, resulting in his knee injuries. R., pp. 160-61 (Henrie
Depo., p. 112:19-114:20; R., pp. 161-62 (Henrie Depo., p. 116:18-117:17; R., pp. 163-64 (Henrie
Depo.,p.122:4-9; 125:17-127:9);R.,p.169-70(HenrieDepo.,p.146:4-23; 149:13-150:3). Thus,
there is sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Henrie's injuries were reasonably foreseeable orresulted
as a natural, probable consequence from the Church forcing him to wear loose clothing in a burned
area while throwing logs. Every member of the Church was required to wear those smocks, as
evidenced by the Mormon Helping Hands video. As a result, this Court must reverse the District
Court's decision granting summary judgment and remand the case back for further proceedings.

D.

MR. HENRIE IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.

Mr. Henrie is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho
Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Idaho Code§ 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow for the award of attorney's
fees and costs in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, unreasonably and without
foundation. I.A.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal. Mr. Henrie
submits that the Church was clearly not entitled to summary judgment, and that the District Court's
grant of summary judgment was unreasonable and without foundation. This case is, unequivocally,
the epitome of a case that should have been presented to the jury for resolution, not the District
Court. For these reasons, Mr. Henrie is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
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Based on the foregoing, Mr. Henrie respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District
Court's grant of summary judgment, and remand the case to the District Court for further
proceedings.
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